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Martin Staniland – University of Pittsburgh (1) 
 
 
Summary 
 
          While  this  is  a  note  about  aviation  security,  it  does  not  purport  to  be  a 
comprehensive  analysis  of t h e  s e c t o r .  I t  s e e k s  r a t h e r  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  U S  initiatives 
relating to airline passenger data exchange, outline EU responses to US measures and 
discuss the December 2003 Agreement to resolve the conflict arising from divergent legal 
systems on privacy  and opposition  by civil  liberties groups  (2).  It then  argues  for  a 
multilateral-global framework to provide legal certainty and achieve wider acceptance 
and consensus. 
     
          The events of September 11, 2001 have brought about new challenges to aviation 
security. In the rush to strengthen security and reduce the risks of future terrorist attacks, 
the United States has introduced a series of measures covering technical and economic 
aspects  of  both  passenger  and  cargo  aviation (3). These measures have generated  an 
important debate about their impact on the privacy of passengers traveling to the US.  
 
          In order to improve aviation security, on November 19, 2001 the US adopted the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). This Act requires airlines flying to the 
US to supply US Customs with information relating to passengers before take-off or at 
least  15  minutes  after  departure  (4).  On  May  14,  2002, th e US a d op te d  a n o th e r  l aw  
requiring airlines to transfer passenger data to the US Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. In addition, through the Advanced Passenger Information System  (APIS), the 
US agencies require the name, date of birth, nationality, sex, passport number, and any 
other  information  needed  to  identify  passengers.  Finally,  the  US  also  requires  data 
collected  from  computer  reservation  systems  (CRS),  which  are  connected  to  the 
Passenger Name Record System (PNR)(5). 
 
          The above initiatives and other subsequent US measures such as CAPPS II have 
generated international debate about the impact of these measures on rights to privacy 
and  highlighted the  need  for  a  proper  balance  between  aviation  security  and  privacy 
protection.  The  EU  has i n s i s t e d  t h a t  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  US  measures  contravenes  the 
existing national legislation of EU member states and in particular Article 25 of the EU 
Directive on the protection of personal data that prohibits the transfer of personal data  
from the EU to third countries that do not possess “adequate”  data protection. The EU 
Directive on Data Protection is comprehensive privacy legislation. It came into effect on 
October 25, 1998 and requires the transfer of personal data only to non-EU countries that 
provide an "adequate" level of privacy protection (6). This legislation also requires the 
creation of government agencies and prior approval before data transfer may take place. 
The US approach to privacy combines legislation, regulation and industry self-regulation.   2
          This  long-running  quarrel b e t w e e n  th e  U S a n d  th e  EU  ov e r  d a ta  e x ch an g e  f or  
transatlantic air passengers was finally concluded with an agreement signed in December 
2003. The Agreement between the European Commission and the US Bureau of Customs 
and Border Protection broke a two-year negotiation deadlock and is a first step in the 
search  for a  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  aviation  security  and  data  protection l a w s .  M o r e  
fundamentally,  these  long  negotiations  have  highlighted  important  differences  in data 
protection, which reflect cultural and legal differences about the role of government in 
regulating privacy (7). The EU and US share the goals of enhancing aviation security and 
privacy  protection  but  differ  over t h e  m e a n s  t o  a c h i e v e  them.  The  Agreement  was 
opposed  by  civil  liberties  groups  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  In  April  2004,  the 
European Parliament voted to refer the Agreement to the European Court of Justice.  
 
          We are now witnessing a three-sided conflict over security and privacy, involving 
the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and US authorities, with the 
European  airlines  caught  in  the  middle.  The  US  side  maintains  that  the  agreement 
provides security and protects privacy for travelers. The Commission (which negotiated 
on behalf of the EU) and the Council (which approved the agreement) argued that civil 
liberties  are  sufficiently  protected  and  that  the  EU  has  already  won  a  number  of 
concessions to protect privacy. The EP feels that the Commission and the Council have 
gone out of their way to avoid the Parliament's scrutiny. The agreement, MP's claim, 
should have been submitted to the EP under the "assent" procedure and not only for a 
simple non-binding opinion (8). 
 
          In order to deal comprehensively with the consequences of the US measures, the 
opposition of civil liberty groups and the fragmentation of various national efforts, the 
development of a multilateral arrangement should be considered as a way to join all the 
parties - including industry representatives and civil liberties groups - in an international 
framework. This may prove to be a much more cost-effective way of satisfactorily taking 
into  account  privacy  concerns  and  enhancing  global  aviation  security.  The  European 
Union intends to raise the issue at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
 
  
The Issues 
 
          Since September 11, 2001, transport security has been pushed to the top of the EU 
and US agendas. US initiatives have changed forever the way that transport security is 
approached. Transport authorities and service providers  have  had  to  adjust traditional 
security measures to respond effectively to the new security risks. The EU has given its 
full  support  to  the  US  initiatives  and  has  made  considerable  efforts  to  contribute, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, to the much-needed enhancement of aviation security in a 
number of areas. Thanks to this co-operation, progress has been made and further work is 
underway  to  ensure  legal  certainty  and  to  seek  global  solutions  and  universal 
implementation. Concerted efforts to strengthen aviation security sometimes appear to be 
weakened  by  the  complexity  and  the  multi-faceted  nature  of  the  issues.  The  most 
acrimonious discussions  have centered on a conflict over the personal data details of 
passengers traveling to the US and thus is the subject of this note. The US authorities are   3
adamant that they need to see the data to help them identify potential terrorists in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks. EU concerns relate to a range of measures adopted to 
serve the shared objective of security, but whose broader effect on personal privacy needs 
to be seriously assessed to preserve the balance between civil liberties and security. 
 
          The EU feels that the transfer of data may violate its data protection laws since 
such  data  cannot  be  released  without  passenger  consent  and  has  tried  to  find  a 
compromise between security requirements and respect of civic liberties.  
 
 
US Actions 
 
          Congress created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in November 
2001, thereby ending the decades-old system that allowed airlines to contract out airport 
security  to  private  companies.  In  late  2001,  Congress  passed  the  Aviation  and 
Transportation  Security  Act  (ATSA),  which  created  the  Transportation  Security 
Administration (TSA) as a unit of the Department of Transportation (DOT). This Act 
gave the TSA responsibility for screening air travelers. In late 2002, Congress passed the 
Homeland Security Act, which created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
transferred the TSA to the new DHS. One of TSA's first initiatives was to establish the 
Office  of  National  Risk A s s e s s m e n t  ( O N R A ) .  O N R A ' s  m i s s i o n  i s  t o  d e v e l o p  a n d  
maintain  risk  assessment  systems  to  detect  terrorist  threats.  A  new  comprehensive 
approach was introduced involving, inter alia, measures requiring EU airlines to provide 
information  on  passengers  traveling t o  t h e  U S ,  b a i l i n g -out  airlines  with  financial 
difficulties, cockpit security, scanning luggage for explosives, training pilots and flight 
attendants, and measures dealing with cargo security. 
 
          As  a  result  of  US  initiatives,  airlines  are  faced  with  ever-increasing  security 
challenges  and  new  information  requirements.  A k e y  i s s u e  f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  t h e  
requirement for personal information on travelers to the US. Immediately after September 
11, the US unilaterally rendered mandatory the Advanced Passenger Information System 
(APIS) by threatening non-complying airlines with significant fines. APIS requires EU 
airlines to provide US Customs with personal data on US-bound passengers related to 
their religion and ethnicity and to the financing of their travel to the US; and to share this 
data among federal, state and local agencies for the purpose of ensuring national security. 
 
          The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act rendered mandatory the 
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) and threatened non-complying airlines 
with significant fines if passenger manifest information on passengers traveling to and 
from the U.S. is not submitted. Air carriers are also required by law to submit to U.S. 
Customs  passenger  manifest  information  on  both  passengers  and  crew  members 
(including n a m e s ,   dates  of  birth,  citizenship  and  gender,  and  passport  and  visa 
information) b e f o r e  t h e i r  a r r i v a l  i n  t h e  U S  a n d  p r i o r  t o  d eparture  (Passenger  Name 
Records [PNR] Data). If information is incomplete or inaccurate, airlines face fines of 
$5,000 per person payable to US Customs and $1,000 per flight to the U.S. Immigration 
Service. Travel agencies in Europe feel that the current configuration of the Computer   4
Reservation Systems (CRSs) does not accommodate all data requirements. An  interim 
new rule published in the June 25, 2002 Federal Register requires air carriers to grant the 
U.S. Customs Data Center electronic access to the carriers’ automated reservation system 
and/or  department  control  system  that  sets  out t h e  identity  and  travel  plans  of  all 
passengers on flights in foreign air transportation either to or from the U.S. In order to 
boost compliance, the Customs Service has introduced additional provisions. Effective 
immediately, Customs will not approve new landing rights requests from carriers that do 
not  give  APIS  data  and  will  assess  non-compliance  fines  up  to  $5,000.  Also, t h e  
minimum standard for complete and accurate data will increase to 97 percent. Another 
issue is the double immigration checks (departure and arrival) to which passengers are 
being subjected, where the possibility of reciprocal arrangements has not been explored. 
 
Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the US airlines conducted travelers 
screening  and  administered  the  Computer  Assisted  Passenger  Prescreening  System 
(CAPPS  I),  subject  to  federal  guidelines.  ONRA  was  mandated  by  the  Congress  to 
implement  the  CAPPS  II  system  - t h e  n e w  g e n e r a ti o n  p a s s e nger-screening  system  - 
which  is  primarily  designed  to  confirm  the  identities  of  air  travelers  and  to  identify 
travelers who may pose a security threat. It will use routine information from the CRSs to 
confirm a passenger's  identity and assess the ri sk l ev el. It should be noted that since 
September 11, in addition to PNR and APIS, there is other US legislation that seems to 
undermine civil liberties in the name of security (9). 
 
 
The EU’s Response to US Initiatives  and the December 2003 Agreement 
 
          In the aftermath of September 11, the European Commission rushed to prepare 
legislation on improving air security, most notably in airports. On September 21, 2001, 
the  European  Council  called  on  Member  States  to  introduce  more  stringent  security 
measures c o n c e r n i n g  t e c h n i c a l  t r a i n i n g  f o r  c r e w s,  checking  and  monitoring  of  hold 
luggage,  protection  of  cockpit  access  and  quality  control  of  security  measures.  New 
proposals  have  been  put  forward  to  support  the  aviation  industry  in  areas  such  as 
insurance, unfair competition and financial compensation. New initiatives have also been 
launched to increase security and prevent terrorist acts. These measures were outlined in 
a  Communication  of  October  2001  that s p e c i f i c a l l y  e x a m i n e d  U S  i n i t i a t i v e s  a n d  
reviewed the state of play and measures taken by Member States. The Laeken Summit 
(December 2001) welcomed the adoption of a common position by the Council regarding 
the regulation of aviation security. On the international front, work is under way at the 
ICAO to establish a list of mandatory international security rules for domestic as well as 
international flights and to monitor compliance. These rules cover access to the cockpit, 
including strengthened doors, and remote surveillance of the cockpit. 
 
          The  EU’s  cooperation  with  the  US i s  b a s e d  o n  the New Transatlantic  Agenda 
(NTA)  which  shapes  US-EU relations  in  aviation  security  (10).  The NTA process  is 
summit-driven  and  emphasizes  joint  action  to  address  key  issues  such  as  emerging 
security challenges  in the context  of globalization. The 1998 Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP) produced "Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency"   5
that f u r t h e r  e n c o u r a g e d  b o t h  s i d e s  t o  e x c h a n g e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  promote  regulatory 
convergence. Thus a dialogue on aviation security was initiated within this framework 
and ad hoc expert groups created to tackle regulatory security issues. This co-operation 
was reinforced by the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) and the involvement of 
the Congressional and EU legislators on regulatory policy issues such as privacy and data 
exchange. In 2003, Congressmen Mica and DeFazio and their colleagues in the European 
Parliament participated in a positive video conference on the conflict between EU privacy 
regulations and the US requirement to access airline passenger data to combat terrorism. 
In late 2002, the EU and the US began talks on the issue by attempting to strike a balance 
between  data  provision  and  aviation  security.  The  EU  has  stressed  the  need  for 
consultation wi th ai rlines to take into account thei r concerns over the practicality and 
benefits of the APIS and the conformity of APIS requirements to the EU data protection 
laws  (11).  In  March  2003, t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  U S  C u s t o ms  and  Border 
Protection (CBP) reached a transitional arrangement regarding the sharing of passenger 
data on transatlantic flights. Since then, EU airlines have been obliged to supply the CBP 
with Passenger Name Records (PNR) data for passengers whose travel itinerary includes 
flights into, out of, or through the US. In exchange for the agreement to release data, the 
CBP  has  given  the  EU  assurances  about  the  appropriate  handling  of  this  data.  This 
agreement  represents  a  transitional  system  and  both  sides  agreed  to  work  towards  a 
bilateral arrangement under which the EU will adopt a legislative act in accordance with 
the provisions of EU data protection legislation. 
 
          Discussions  continued  throughout  2003  and  in  December  the  European 
Commission agreed to provide the US with Passenger Name Records (PNR) on its airline 
passengers traveling to the US, thereby ending a long-running battle between the EU and 
the US and removing a potential rift in transatlantic co-operation. This agreement covers 
only PNR and comes after a year of negotiations in which the US has sought extensive 
access to personal data of passengers traveling to the US (12). 
 
          The Commission produced a draf t Deci si on  (with 25 preambles and 8 articles) 
declaring that the "Undertakings" provided by the US for access to passenger record data 
(PNR) are "adequate" under EU law (Article 25.6 of the 1995 Data Protection Directive). 
The  Decision  included  an  "adequate  finding"  statement,  affirming  that  US  privacy 
protections to be implemented by the DHS are appropriate to guarantee air travelers’ 
privacy.  It  also  affirms  that t h e  p r o t e c t i o n s  p u t  i n  p l a c e  f o r  t h e  u s e ,   sharing,  and 
monitoring of information, as well as the redress mechanisms associated with the use of 
data  by  the  CBP, a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  u n d e r  E u r o p e a n  l a w  a g e n c i e s  as  allowed  by  the 
agreement. The data will be retained for three and a half years for use by the CBP in 
fulfilling its own law enforcement functions and by other law enforcement agencies as 
allowed by the agreement. 
 
          The U S ,  for  its  part, a g r e e d  to  create  an  independent  body  outside  the  US 
government with the right to examine and correct data held by it. The agreement will 
enter into force and be in place for three and a half years, with renegotiations beginning 
in two and a half years. The DHS will initiate a series of undertakings related to how the 
DHS and the CBP will utilize and retain the PNR data and will put in place privacy   6
protections and redress mechanisms. The US also agreed to provide similar data on US 
citizens when they fly to Europe. In addition, the European Commission has committed 
itself to proceed with rapid negotiations about a legal framework for TSA's use of PNR 
data for CAPPS II. 
 
          According  to  the  data  protection  office  of  Lufthansa, t h e  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 3  
agreement has resulted in a so-called "push solution" to restrict the threat to European 
travelers’ p r i v a c y .   The  push  solution  calls  for  airlines  to  create  a  back-up  copy  of 
travelers’ i nf orm ati on  stored i n  th ei r PNR (Passen ger Nam e Record)  system 24 hours 
before departure. This would allow airlines to filter sensitive information that is protected 
under the European Data Protection Directive. The information then would be transferred 
to CBP, instead of allowing full access to all data. 
 
          On March 29, 2004, the Agreement was adopted by the EU Ministers of Justice 
and Home Affairs. On April 1, 2004, the European Parliament voted by 229 to 202 in 
favor of the suspension of the agreement and reiterated its opposition to the transfer of 
passenger data to US authorities. On April 21, the EP voted to refer the agreement to the 
European Court of Justice. The MP’s felt that there were legitimate reasons for requesting 
the Court to rule on both the procedure and the substance of the agreement on the ground 
that sharing passenger data with a foreign country violates European law. MEPs did not 
agree with the Commission that the US authorities provided enough privacy safeguards 
and called on the Commission to re-open negotiations.  Furthermore, the vote calls into 
question the Commission’s authority to negotiate international agreements on behalf of 
the EU. The vote also seems to indicate the MPs’ desire to use the issue to expand their 
power  in  light  of  the  ongoing  discussions  on  the  Constitution.  In  addition  to  these 
bilateral negotiations, the EU continued its efforts to bring the passenger data exchange 
issue up for discussion at the ICAO. The EU Working Party on Aviation has agreed on a 
submission  to  the  next  meeting o f  the  ICAO  for  a  global  agreement  on  the  prior 
transmission of passenger data (PNR) before a plane takes off. In addition to the US, 
Canada  and  Australia  are  introducing  PNR  schemes  and  law  enforcement  authorities 
around the world are increasingly requesting access to passenger data to deal with the 
threat of terrorism. 
 
 
The Agreement and its Critics 
 
The EU and US share the goals of enhancing aviation security and privacy protection but 
differ over the means to achieve them. These differences reflect divergent cultural and 
legal  approaches  to t h e  r o l e  o f  g o v e r nment  in  regulating  privacy  (13).  The  EU/US 
Agreement on data passenger exchange has generated international debate on its impact 
on privacy rights and highlighted the need for a proper balance between aviation security 
and privacy protection. Civil liberties advocates in the EU have insisted that compliance 
with US measures contravenes the existing national legislation of EU member states and 
in  particular  Article  25  of  the  EU  Directive  on  the  protection  of  personal  data  that 
prohibits the transfer of personal data from the EU to third countries that do not possess 
‘adequate’ data  protection.  The  EU  Directive  on  Data  Protection  is  comprehensive   7
privacy legislation. It came into effect on October 25, 1998, and requires the transfer of 
personal  data  only  to  non-EU  countries  that  provide  an  "adequate"  level  of  privacy 
protection. This legislation also requires the creation of government agencies and prior 
approval before data transfer may take place. 
 
          The transfer of data to US agencies is not an obligation of the airlines according to 
EU law and can hardly be seen as relating to the original obligation of the airlines to their 
customers, w h i c h  i s  t o  i s s u e  a  ti c k e t  a n d  d e l i v e r  a  s e r v i c e .  T h i s  d i f f i c u l ty  c o u l d  b e  
overcome and disclosure of data could be allowed if the airlines get the consent of their 
passengers. The Directive also prohibits any processing of sensitive data without explicit 
consent  or  substantial  public  interest.  With  regard  to  the  transfer  of  data  to  third 
countries, Article 25 of the EU Directive defines an ‘adequate level’ of safeguards and 
permits data transfer for combatting terrorism. 
 
          A brief analysis of the main Articles of the EU Directive on Data Protection that 
imposes strict requirements on data collection and processing is provided below: 
 
•  Data processing must be allowed for an explicit and legitimate purpose (Article 6 
[1b]); 
•  Data collection must be adequate, not excessive, and relevant to the purposes for 
which data are collected (Article 6 [1c]), 
•  Data must be accurate and must only be shared as long as it is necessary for the 
given purpose (Art. 6 [1d and e]). 
 
There are also other obligations such as the right to know if data is being processed and 
for what purpose (Articles 10 and 11), as well as the right of access (Article 22). 
 
 
National Security Exemption Clause 
 
          The Directive provides (Article 13) exemptions to the data processing obligations 
by stipulating that the scope of the obligations may be restricted when such restriction 
constitutes a necessary measure to safeguard national security and public safety. This 
requirement is a specific request with which the US general request does not comply. 
 
 
Limits to Original Purpose 
 
          The US requests violate the general purpose of the Directive, which stipulates that 
data-processing is allowed only as long as it is compatible with the original purpose for 
which the data have been collected. The air carriers collect data in order to deliver a 
service and not to transfer data to the US. Furthermore, Article 6 cannot apply to transfer 
of data related to persons not traveling to the US. 
 
 
   8
Transfer of Data to "Third Countries" 
 
          The Directive prohibits any transfer of data to third countries if these countries do 
not  provide  an  "adequate level" of  protection  and  safeguards.  Therefore, even  if  it  is 
argued that the transfer  is compatible with the  contractual purpose of the air carriers 
(since without the transfer of data, the air carrier cannot carry passengers to the US), the 
consent of each individual passenger is required for the transfer. Other exemptions from 
the third country prohibition listed in Article 26 are not applicable since there is no proof 
that the transfer is necessary to safeguard public interests.  
 
          The Agreement has  been  criticized  by  civil  liberty groups on both sides of the 
Atlantic for violating privacy rights. They claim that data privacy rights have been eroded 
in response to the Sept 11 events (14). Measures such as PNR and APIS concerning data 
retention would normally have taken years to debate but, post-September 11, they were 
pushed right to the top of the agenda and rushed through, despite opposition by personal 
liberties groups. These groups have stressed the need for consultations with airlines and 
civil society, so that the practicality and benefits of passenger data exchange and its 
conformity with legal frameworks can be taken into account. Despite US efforts to deal 
with the impact of these measures on civil liberties, privacy continues to be a marginal 
consideration in the development of US policy. Civil liberties advocates feel that such 
measures have diminished privacy protection in significant ways. It is now much easier 
for  law  enforcement  officers  to  conduct  surveillance  and  eliminate    the  checks  and 
balances that previously were given to the courts to ensure that these powers are not 
abused.   
 
          Despite  opposition  from  civil  liberties  groups,  the  European  Commission  has 
agreed to data transfers as it was felt that this was the only practical way of avoiding 
lengthy delays for European travelers to the US and fines against European airlines which 
do not provide the required data to the US authorities. The European Parliament felt that 
some of the information required by the US authorities is classified as sensitive in Europe 
and that, once stored in the US, there are no guarantees that it will not be shared or even 
transferred to third countries. EU citizens will have no effective right to access nor will 
they be able to correct the data. They cannot seek legal redress for its misuse and they 
will be subject to US administrative undertakings without commensurate rights under it. 
The agreement establishes a weak due process procedure that is entirely internal to the 
US Department of Homeland Security, whereas EU rules require a true right of redress 
for citizens who believe their data is being abused. Privacy International, for example, 
argued that the agreement has not assured adequate protection, clear purpose limitation 
and non-excessive data collection and does not guarantee against data transfer beyond the 
Department of Homeland Security (15). 
 
          With regard to following up on the December 2003 Agreement, there are several 
critical issues that concern the airlines and these need to be addressed. Steps must be 
taken to ensure that airlines are not forced to violate the laws of  their  own  or  other 
countries in order to comply with US requirements. Airlines are subject to their own 
national legislation and to the data protection laws of the countries in which they operate.   9
However, in most instances an airline's ability to comply with US requirements will be 
based  upon  political  decisions  taken  by U S  a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d  o t h e r  g o v e r n m e n t s .  T h i s  
requires active cooperation between the US and appropriate ministries and data privacy 
authorities (where they  have  been established)  in the  various countries. Gaining  final 
approval from various governments for providing US authorities with access to carriers’ 
systems will likely prove to be a very com plex  and time-consuming process in many 
instances, particularly in those EU countries that have implemented data privacy laws in 
compliance with  the 1995 EU Directive. A considerable challenge to EU-US relations is 
how to structure relations within the NTA process to deal with bilateral issues and how to 
move toward multi-lateralizing transatlantic arrangements for global consensus. In fact, 
security standards on which the EU and the US are in accordance are more likely to 
become accepted by other countries, thus becoming de facto international standards.  
 
          The EU also felt that the preparation of a single model at the global level is the 
most  cost-effective  way  to  combat  terrorism  and  terrorism-related  crimes  with 
international implications. It is imperative to start work on a global framework to bring 
all interested stakeholders to the negotiating table and to develop a framework that takes 
into account aviation security and personal data protection requirements. This will help to 
avoid time-consuming bilateral talks and ensure coordination and convergence between 
the various systems worldwide. 
 
          In  order  to  restore  the  public's  confidence  in  the  aviation  system, p e r s o n a l  
information provided to airlines must be adequately protected within a global framework.    
For these reasons, the EU fully supports initiatives to create a multilateral framework for 
data transfer within the ICAO. The Commission believes that it is entirely impractical for 
all airlines collecting and processing data to have to operate under multiple unilaterally-
imposed or bilaterally-agreed requirements. A  paper  submitted  by  the  Netherlands  on 
behalf  of  the  Community  and  its  Member  States  calls  upon t h e  I C A O  t o  develop 
international  standards  to  remove  technical  burdens  that  may  impair  the  smooth 
functioning  and  implementation  of  those  uniform  practices,  which  could  include  the 
appropriate  configuration  of  the  PNR  system. T h e s e  g lobally-agreed  standards  are 
necessary to ensure harmonization of data exchange methodologies and processes. The 
35th Session of the ICAO Assembly in 2004 decided to set up a working group to address 
a range of different aspects concerning categories of data, data processing requirements, 
data transfer requirements and data structure and to submit its report early in 2005 (16). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
          This  analysis  of  the  main  elements  of p o l i c y  d e v e l o p m e n t s  o n  p r i v a c y -related 
aviation  security  measures  since  September 1 1 , 2 0 0 1  p e r m i t s  a  n u m b e r  of  tentative 
conclusions about the possibilities for an effective  resolution  of  the  issue  based  on  a 
global consensus. US aviation security measures on data transfer, which came into effect 
after September 11, 2001, have generated an important debate on thei r impact on the 
privacy protection of passengers traveling to the US. Privacy and aviation security are 
two major areas of concern on both sides of the Atlantic. However, appr oach es wi th   10 
regard  to  the  means  of  enhancing  security  vary  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  Many 
European analysts believe that the impact of US measures on privacy will outweigh the 
improvement of security. Normally, such measures would have followed years of debate 
but, after September 11, they were pushed to the top of the agenda and rushed through 
despite opposition from civil liberties groups on both sides of the Atlantic. These groups 
have  stressed  the  need  for  consultations  with  industry  and  civil  society  so  that  the 
practicality  and  benefits  of  the  measures  and  their  conformity  with  data  protection 
requirements of the EU and other countries can be assessed and taken into account. A 
central issue in the debate lies in the possibility of using the information provided to the 
US authorities to serve purposes unrelated to the fight against terrorism. 
 
          Growing concerns over privacy in the US came into sharper focus in January 2004 
as US  lawyers pursued cases agai nst Northwest  Airlines i n  th e U S  f or  h an ding  over 
passenger  data  to  the  federal  government.  The  suit  seeks,  inter  alia,  an  order  for 
Northwest to notify all passengers affected by the passenger data requirement. The airline 
has  argued  that, w h i l e  b e l i e v i n g  i t  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  a v i a t i o n  s e c u r i t y  to 
transfer data to the government, a protocol should be set up to address privacy concerns. 
As a result of these proceedings, US airlines  have  agreed to work with the DHS on 
traveler privacy protection. 
 
          At  issue here is how the data will  be treated. Will passengers be  informed that 
personal information is being shared with the government? Will the rules be clear about 
the  purposes  for  which  data  can  be  shared?  Many  industry  analysts  feel  that  it  is 
necessary to develop internal protocols. 
 
          The December 2003 Agreement between the Commission and the US authorities 
can be considered as a first step towards an international solution to security issues such 
as the transfer of passenger data. It was seen by the Commission as the only practical way 
of  avoiding  lengthy  delays  for  European  travelers  to  the  US a n d  f i n e s  a g a i n s t  a n y  
European airlines that did not provide data to the US authorities. The  Agreement was 
approved by the European Council, while the European Parliament voted to refer it to the 
European Court of Justice. Member State governments have been asked to refrain from 
finalizing the agreement wi th the US until the Court has delivered i ts opinion on the 
compatibility of the data transfer with EU law. Divergent legal frameworks (US privacy 
law protects US citizens, while EU privacy law protects personal data in the EU) have 
provided the basis for the EP's opposition to the agreement and have prevented its final 
conclusion. 
 
          We are now witnessing a three-sided conflict over data protection involving the 
European Commission, the EP and US authorities, with the European airlines caught in 
the middle. The US maintains that the agreement provides security and protects privacy 
for travelers. The Commission (which negotiated on behalf of the EU) and the Council 
(which approved the agreement) argued that civil liberties are adequately protected and 
that the EU had already won a number of concessions to protect privacy. For example, 
US authorities will store the data for only 3 1/2 years instead of 50 years as originally 
requested. Of the approximately 60 data items originally requested, only 34 remain on the   11 
list - mainly passenger name, address, date of ticket issuance, and number of pieces of 
baggage checked. The EP feels that the Commission and the Council have gone out of 
their way to avoid its scrutiny. It claims that the agreement should have been submitted to 
the EP under the "assent" procedure and not for a simple non-binding opinion (13). Some 
analysts in Europe feel that the EP hijacked the issues of aviation security and privacy for 
the sake of an inter-institutional power play with the Commission. 
 
          Although the agreement has helped to reduce differences about data protecti on , 
uncertainties remain between the EU and the US about the scope of privacy safeguards 
and the degree of legal certainty achieved with the agreement. It should be noted that the   
agreement  covers  only  PNR  and  that  the  US  is  proceeding  with  further  work  for 
additional requirements that could complicate further the search for legal certainty. 
 
          The most pressing challenge is to promote aviation security at the global level by 
contributing  to  the  development  of  a  comprehensive  regime  that t a k e s  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
American  and  European c o n c e r n s , a s  w e l l  a s  t h i r d  c o u n t r i e s ’ r e q u i r e m e n t s , w h i l e  
providing additional legal certainty. The EU and the US must act in concert and play 
leading roles in this context. 
 
          Therefore, there is a need to develop an aviation security framework in the form of 
an international agreement that avoids the privacy protection pitfalls implied by the US 
approach, improves legal certainty and eliminates the need for bilateral negotiations that 
fragment  efforts  and  result  in  conflicting  compliance  requirements  for  the  affected 
airlines. 
 
          The European Community and its Member States intend to seek the development 
of uniform practices and standards at the international level within the framework of the 
ICAO. It is felt that ICAO standards would assist the industry to design their systems 
according to a standard model rather than being faced with different systems that would 
be  bothersome and costly. The EU global  initiative  for an arrangement  in the ICAO 
should be launched as soon as possible. To sum up, the development of a multilateral 
arrangement joining all the parties, i n cl udi ng industry representatives and civil liberty 
groups, could prove to be a much more cost-effective way of enhancing global aviation 
security and coordinating  fragmented national efforts.  
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Endnotes 
 
(1) Dinos Stasinopoulos, a former European Commission official, would like to thank 
Professor Alberta Sbragia, Director of the Center for West European Studies (CWES) 
and the European Union Center (EUC), and the Center’s staff for their support during his 
Fellowship at the University of Pittsburgh. This note was prepared as a part of an EU 
Fellowship research project carried out in fall 2002 at the EUC of the University Center 
for International Studies. Martin Staniland is Professor in the Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh. 
  
(2) Definitions of privacy vary widely according to context. This note interprets privacy 
in  terms  of  data  protection  and  management of personal  information; see J. Mi ch ael , 
“Privacy and Human Rights” (UNESCO 1994) and W. J. Long and M. Pang Qeek M., 
“Personal  Data Privacy Protection  in  an A g e  of  Gl ob al i z ation,” Journal of European 
Public Policy 9:3, 325-344. 
 
(3) Some of these proposals, such as cockpit security, baggage screening, and placing sky 
marshals in flights, are sound security measures and do not implicate privacy interests. 
They are therefore not dealt with here. 
 
(4) On November 19, 2001, the US Presi dent signed the Aviation and Transportation 
Security  Act  (ATSA),  which  among  other  things  established  the  TSA  within  the 
Department of Transportation. TSA's main function is to implement the Act by reforming 
the nation's transport security system. The Act established a series of challenging but 
critically important milestones toward achieving a secure transport system. More broadly, 
however,  the  Act  will  fundamentally  change  the  way  transportation  security  will  be 
managed  in  the  US.  The  Act  recognizes  the  importance  of  security  for  all  forms  of 
transportation  and  related  infrastructure  elements.  Infrastructure  protection  of  critical 
assets such as airports and more than 10,000 FAA facilities is another of the TSA's key 
missions. Along with airports, other transportation networks are critical to U.S. economic 
and national security and vital for the free and seamless movement of passengers and 
goods throughout the country. 
 
(5)  PNR  refers  to  processing d a t a  h e l d  i n  a i r l i n e  r e s e r v a t i o n  s y s t e m s  a s  a  tool  for 
enhanced  risk  assessment  applied  to  flights  arriving  from  international  ports  of 
embarkation. This is a separate undertaking and should not be confused with Advanced 
Passenger Information (API) regimes. 
 
(6)  The  main  legal  instrument  for  data  protection  is  the  Data  Protection  Directive 
95/46/EC  of  October 2 4 ,  1 9 9 5 ,  on  the  protection  of  individuals  with  regard  to  the 
processing  of  personal  data  and  on  free  movement  of  such  data ( OJL  11.23.1995). 
However, delays in implementation by Member States and differences in the ways the 
directive has been applied at the national level have caused problems that are particularly 
due to the lack of clarity of some transposition laws. Efforts are being made to achieve 
clarity and to simplify procedures and notification requirements. 
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(7) As early as 1990, di scussi ons were h el d to i ron  ou t di ff eren ces an d to provide  a 
streamlined means for compliance, and the US and the European Commission developed 
a "safe harbor" framework. The Safe Harbor arrangement on privacy and data protection 
is a hybrid, quasi-formal or informal arrangement and represents a compromise between 
the EU approach of formal, legal governance of privacy and the US approach that relies 
on s e l f -regulation  and  creates a  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n t e r f a c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  a p p r o a c h e s .  I t  
includes the following seven principles: 
 
(a) Notice - An organization must inform individuals about the purposes for which it 
collects information about them; 
 
(b) Choice - An organization must offer individuals the opportunity to choose whether, 
and how, personal information they provide is used or disclosed to third parties; 
 
(c)  Transfer  -  An  organization  may  disclose  personal  information  to  third  parties 
consistent with the principles of notice and choice; 
 
(d)  Security  - O r g a n i zations  creating,  maintaining,  using  or  disseminating  personal 
information must take reasonable measures to assure its reliability for its intended use 
and reasonable precautions to protect it from loss or unauthorized access; 
 
(e) Data Integrity - Consistent with these principles, an organization may only process 
personal information relevant to the purposes for which it has been gathered; 
 
(f) Access - Individuals must have reasonable access to personal information about them 
that an organization holds and be able to correct or amend that information where it is 
inaccurate; and 
 
(g) Enforcement - Effective privacy protection must include mechanisms for assuring 
compliance with safe harbor principles, recourse for individuals to whom the data relate  
to ensure compliance with the principles, and punitive consequences for the organization 
when the principles are not followed. 
 
(8) The assent procedure was introduced by the Single European Act (1986). It means 
that  the  Council  has  to  obtain  the  European  Parliament's  assent  before  certain  very 
important  decisions  are  taken.  Parliament  can  accept  or  reject  a  proposal  but  cannot 
amend it. 
  
(9) The "USA Patriot Act” - no. 107-56/2001 - requires agencies to consider both security 
and privacy as they implement regulations on a range of security measures and identify 
policy alternatives that would achieve the same security goal while limiting the impact on 
privacy.  The  "Federal  Agency  Protection  of  Privacy  Act"  aims  at  establishing  basic 
checks  and  balances  on  federal  agencies’ d e c i s i o n s  t o  u s e  a n d  d i s c l o s e  p e r s o n a l  
information. The Act would require agencies to engage in a systematic review of privacy 
before  federal  regulations  are  adopted  and  would  encourage e n h a n c e d  p u b l i c  
participation and agency accountability for individual privacy interests.   14 
(10) In addition to the NTA process, transatlantic relations in transportation security are 
embedded in a dense network of multilateral links, including annual meetings  of  the 
Group of Eight (G8), semi-annual meetings among top officials, and shared partnership 
in  international  organizations  such  as  the  ICAO  and  the  European  Civil  Aviation 
Conference (ECAC). The international  institutional environment within which the US 
and EU cooperate in addressing aviation security is also of crucial importance because 
most  of  the  issues  have  a  global  dimension.  International  organizations  regularly 
contribute  to  the  establishment  of  rules  and  norms  (regimes)  regulating  international 
activities such as aviation, maritime transportation and customs. The roles played by the 
ICAO and the ECAC in aviation security are illustrative of the value and importance of 
regimes.  This  partnership  at  the  multilateral/plurilateral  level  is  supplemented  by  the 
bilateral framework of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) that shapes US-EU relations 
in aviation security. 
 
(11)  “Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  Parliament  on 
Transfer of Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach.” 
 
(12) “Council Decision of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the 
European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of 
PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection.” (Official Journal of the European Union, L. 183/83, 
5.20.2004). 
 
(13)  Four  models  of  information  protection  have  been  developed  worldwide:  (a) 
comprehensive  laws;  (b)  sectoral  laws;  (c)  industry  self-regulation; a n d  (d)  privacy- 
enhancing technologies. Legal frameworks on the collection, processing and disclosure of 
personal information have been the object of different approaches on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The EU has developed comprehensive data-protection legislation, while the US 
relies  on  a  combination  of  sectoral  laws,  self-regulation,  and  privacy-enhancing 
technologies for data protection. There is no explicit guarantee of privacy rights under the 
Constitution of the US since no equivalent federal data privacy legislation exists. The 
fundamental  problem  is  that  there  are n o  c l e a r  l e g a l  r e m e d i e s  f o r  b r e a c h e s  o f  d a t a  
privacy. The US approach has  been to set up industry-specific codes of practice that 
provide a  measure of protection, al th ough  th ere are  n o substan ti v e pen al ti es f or n on- 
compliance and these codes are not considered by the EU as offering an adequate level of 
protection.  The US, h ow e v e r , d oe s  n o t l e gi sl a te  a  priori a n d  r el i es  on  th e  C ou r ts  t o 
effectively sanction a deficit in data protection. The EU gives priority to the protection of 
personal data an a priori basis through legislation and it defines privacy as a human right, 
while the US tends to trust the private sector and the market to protect personal privacy. 
The EU law, in particular the EU Directive that provides strict safeguards on the use and 
disclosure of data, has spurred the development of comprehensive data protection around 
the world. 
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